We explore the effects of two kinds of competition on the cost of capital in the tax-exempt bond market: (1) competition amongst underwriters and (2) competition amongst issuers (most of which are quasi-public special authorities sanctioned by state governments). The first kind of competition--essentially, competitive versus negotiated bidding processes--has received considerable attention in the literature. The second kind of competition, the number of potential issuers available to a beneficiary of a bond issue, has received far less attention and is related to the level of decentralization of the market for issuing bonds.
systematic explorations of the impact that levels of competition inherent in state-level taxexempt bond markets have on the cost of capital. This study continues the debate over the impact of competition in the municipal bond market and, using a national database covering fourteen years, finds that both kinds of competition do in fact lower borrowing costs, at least in the hospital sector.
Competition in State-level Bond Markets and the Role of Special Authorities
Municipal bonds are generally issued either (1) by state and local governments or (2) Finance Authorities are created by state and local governments specifically to issue tax-exempt bonds. The generic term for both types is "financing agency," and we use the word "authorities" to refer specifically to the quasi-government entities. Approximately two-thirds of all municipal bond financings 1980-1993 were originated by financing authorities. For hospital bonds, the figure is 80 per cent.
Hildreth (1993, 44) explains the popularity of finance authorities as a critical component of "avoidance strategies" that state and local governments use to overcome "structural hurdles" in the process of financing infrastructure: "… [Finance Authorities are] often termed off-budget entities-empowered to issue revenue bonds without placing at direct risk the taxing capacity, or full-faith-and-credit guarantee. In fact, many off-budget entities serve as 'conduits,' defined as a governmental issuer of securities with an ultimate credit source being a private profit-making or nonprofit organization [e.g., a hospital]."
Authorities help governments circumvent debt caps and requirements for referenda.
They may also help them provide services now for which the bills come due later.
While hospitals and other private profit-making or nonprofit organizations receive the proceeds from bond offerings, they do not issue or sell the bonds. The bonds are issued on their behalf by a financing agency and sold to (or by) an underwriter (i.e., an investment banker) who in turn resells them. Proceeds from the bond sale are then transferred to the beneficiary, on whose behalf the bonds were issued, to meet the purpose of the bond offering.
On a state or local basis there may be more than one financing agency from which the beneficiary is permitted to choose. Presently, in the health care capital finance industry, there are twelve states with hospital finance authorities that have monopolies for issuing tax-exempt bonds. There are nineteen states where hospitals can select from state-level authorities or an alternative, local issuer. The remaining states have only non-state-level issuers. 1 We hypothesize that that these different regimes differ in the extent to which competition exists among issuers, and in the next section we test if this affects the cost of capital.
The financing agencies are responsible for matching hospitals with underwriters.
Although it is the hospital that ultimately agrees to an underwriter, the financing agency usually chooses the pool of underwriters from which the hospital must select. So, the hospital chooses the financing agency (which as noted is a virtual statewide monopoly in twelve states), and then the hospital chooses an underwriter based on those acceptable to the financing authority. 2 Also, the financing agency can influence and may even decide whether the bond deal will proceed as a competitive issue (based on sealed bids by acceptable underwriters), a negotiated issue (where the hospital chooses a particular underwriter from a pool of acceptable ones), or a private placement (where the underwriter is bypassed altogether).
The other competition, thus, is among investment bankers for deals. Previous analyses provide some evidence that competition among bankers (competitive bidding for underwriting opportunities as opposed to negotiated deals) lowers the costs of capital in the hospital bond market. 3 But competition among underwriters is not entirely absent in a negotiated deal because the lead underwriter is selected from a potential pool. It has become evident to us from our work and discussions with those involved in bond issues that the financing authority is often the locus of this competition. Indeed, as mentioned above, some authorities dictate the selection of a lead underwriter while others severely limit the number of potential lead underwriters among which the hospital must choose. It is plausible that the ability of an authority to limit the pool of underwriters is inversely related to the amount of competition that it faces.
The negotiated method is employed in approximately 94 percent of all issues of taxexempt hospital bonds. 4 Typically, interest rates on competitive issues are lower than on negotiated issues. Possibly this occurs because negotiated underwriters offer more services to the issuer (Sorensen, 1979) . Negotiated hospital bond financings and private placements may also be riskier and may require more inputs from underwriters than similar corporate bond financings.
But part of these differentials can also be due to the absence of competitive market forces in negotiated deals and private placements (Kessel, 1971) . The plausibility of this argument is underscored by several scandals involving the issuance of negotiated municipal bonds, for instance in New Jersey in 1993. These scandals led then Governor Jim Florio to issue an executive order requiring that underwriters on future state bond deals be chosen by competitive bidding unless a strong justification could be made for another method of selection (Spiro, Light, Hawkins, and Smith 1993) . Of course, there are myriad examples that have raised similar concerns, such as the yield burning accusations of the early 1990s. Finally, as Roden and Bland (1986) and Bland (1985) explain, inexperienced and unsophisticated issuers may negotiate poorly. Again, in the next section we test if the choice of competitive or negotiated bidding processes affects the cost of capital. Characteristics; and Hospital Characteristics (including experience in the bond market). We present here two regressions using the same regressors except for the measure of market concentration. Regression (1) uses the concentration ratio while (2) uses the Herfindahl Index.
Findings: Competition Matters

INSERT
The box on "Data and Methodology" provides more detail on and justification for this model, as well as variable definitions and other details on the database used. The box also explains the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index. Concisely, both are higher the more concentrated, or centralized, the market to issue bonds in a state.
The coefficients for both negotiated sales and private placements are positive, significant, and relatively large in magnitude, indicating that these methods raise the cost of capital for hospital bonds in comparison to competitive sales. In fact, we estimate that the tic would decline by 58 basis points if the percentage of competitive issues rose from its current value of about 6 percent to 100 percent. 5 The reduction in the tic that would accompany a much smaller increase in the percentage of competitive issues obviously would be much more modest. Our results suggest that cost savings would be realized by hospitals and third-party payors, including the Federal government, if underwriters were selected by competitive bidding more often. Indeed, the financial stakes are quite high. We compute that a reduction of only 10 basis points for all 1,152 hospital bonds in 1993 would have yielded $200 million in savings.
The coefficients on the measures of market concentration are positive and statistically significant in each of the regressions. These results imply that reductions in concentration lower the cost of capital; thus, decentralized states are better off. 6 Moreover, we calculate that a one standard deviation increase in issuers or reduction in concentration reduces the tic by approximately 12 basis points. While this may appear small at first, the effect is larger than that associated with a one standard deviation increase in the hospital's overall operating margin or its potential profitability under Medicare's prospective payment system. It is approximately equal to the premium associated with the inclusion of a call provision. Moreover, the cost of a bond's aggregate debt service during its life of twenty to thirty years to maturity is several times its par value. As noted about, a reduction in the interest rate of only a few basis points could yield substantial savings over time.
To further gauge the magnitude of the concentration effects, we consider how much the tic inclusive of fee would fall if each issuer had approximately the same share in real par value.
The concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index have means of 0.83 and 0.45, respectively.
These are the means of the actual variables rather than the antilogarithms of the means of their logarithms, presented in Table B1 . Based on the number of different issuers in the issue year, there were 13 different issuers per state who issued bonds in a typical year in the period from 1980 through 1993. If each issuer had the same share in real par value, the Herfindahl index would equal 0.08, and the concentration ratio would equal 0.31. A two standard deviation reduction in the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl index would produce an actual index of 0.08, and a three standard deviation reduction in the natural logarithm of the concentration ratio would produce an actual ratio of 0.35. Therefore, we use a two standard deviation reduction in the case of the Herfindahl index and a three standard deviation reduction in the case of the concentration ratio. For the Herfindahl index, the average two standard deviation effect amounts to 14 basis points for the tic inclusive of fee. For the concentration ratio, the average three standard deviation effect amounts to 34 basis points for the tic inclusive of fee. We view an average of the two figures for each tic as the best estimate of the impact of inequality in market shares.
Thus, departures from equality in market shares raise the tic inclusive of fee by 24 basis points.
In sum, both kinds of competition explored in this study appear to affect the cost of capital, and the current system of hospital bond finance could realize significant cost savings through encouraging and promoting competition. In addition, the two kinds of competition (among underwriters and among issuers) are in fact interrelated. Table 2 contains selected issue characteristics by type of issuer.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
These characteristics have proven to be important determinants of bond yields in previous research. Above we found that negotiated issues and private placements carried much higher interest rates than competitive issues. Thus, it is notable that state and local authority bonds are much less likely to be issued on a competitive basis than those of other issuers. Government and district bonds are more likely to be of the general obligation variety. That is, they are more likely to be backed by tax revenue as opposed to hospital revenue. General obligation bonds typically carry lower interest rates than revenue bonds. The table highlights a positive correlation between the probability that a bond is issued on a competitive basis and the probability that it is a general obligation issue. But this cannot account for our finding that competitive issues carry lower yields because we include a dichotomous variable that identifies general obligation bonds in our regressions.
Discussion and the Previous Defense of Negotiated Bidding
We do find that both issuer (e.g., authority) and beneficiary (e.g., hospital) experience lower the cost of capital, which implies that larger, more experienced issuers (which promote market concentration) have some advantages. This fact has also been used to defend negotiated bidding based on the concept that controlling for issuer experience and sophistication mitigates the costly impact of negotiated sales. The signs of the coefficients on both Issuer's history of real par value and Hospital's history of real par values are both negative and statistically significant.
We calculate that one standard deviation increase in issuer experience leads to approximately a 6 basis point reduction in the tic. While this effect may seem modest, it is consistent with some of the work of Robert Bland, who also has shown that the relationship between issuer experience and interest rates is far from clear cut. Bland (1985, 234) reports that experience lowers interest rates and argues that "Not only are experienced issuers better informed, but they will also be better negotiators," and our findings are consistent; however, we still find that negotiation raises the interest rate, even controlling for both issuer and beneficiary experience. This finding conflicts somewhat with Simonsen and Robbins (1996, 62) who find that issuer experience is not significantly associated with interest rates although they do, as mentioned, find that negotiation is more costly than competitive sales. Roden and Bland (1986) also report that issuer sophistication reduces interest costs. On the other hand, Bland (1984, 53) suggests that the "greater the supply of bonds bearing the issuer's name, the greater amount of search by underwriters for the most willing investors and, thus, the higher the interest rate." This is particularly relevant given our measure of issuer's experience. However, we do not find that issuer experience as measured by the par value of previous issues raises the cost of capital. We find that is lowers it. Clearly this is an area for additional research.
In addition, most of the more recent studies rely on relatively small data sets covering one or a few years. Simonsen and Robbins (1996) 
Conclusions, Policy Recommendations, and Directions for Future Research
These results have several implications for public policy at the Federal, state, and local levels. State and local governments should consider means to encourage the sale of revenue bonds through competitive rather than negotiated sales. Simonsen and Robbins (1996) and Bland (1984; 1986) summarize nicely the caveats to this assertion; nevertheless, it appears that more stands to be gained from encouraging competition among underwriters than in dwelling on the exceptions. Requirements like those implemented by Governor Florio in New Jersey appear to have potential for significant cost savings. In particular, with the rising use of quasi-public special finance authorities, which are sanctioned by state governments, states have an interest in ensuring that these loosely-regulated entities follow the least costly practices available.
Regarding these quasi-public authorities, states should ensure that there is competition to issue hospital bonds, and perhaps other revenue bonds, among authorities and other issuers. At least states should not create and protect monopolies in the market to issue these bonds. They should allow more than one state-level authority to issue hospital bonds and/or allow local authorities to do so. Our results indicate that deconcentration of the hospital bond industry would decrease borrowing costs. While it is true that experience on the part of the finance agencies and the beneficiaries may lower the cost of capital (a fact that presumably favors larger and more concentrated issuers), it appears to be more important to promote competition among issuers and allow market forces to determine how many issuers enter the market, and how they achieve their market share.
The Federal Government has several reasons to pay attention to this industry. First, given the tax-deductability of interest earned on municipal bonds, the Federal Government has an interest in ensuring that interest rates are as low as possible to minimize Federal tax expenditures. In addition, the cost of capital in the health care industry affects the cost of providing health care, which is certainly an issue of great salience currently at the Federal level.
Therefore, the Federal Government should consider regulations that would promote competition, both among issuers and among underwriters, in order to realize cost savings in the cost of providing health care and state and local infrastructure.
Clearly there is a need for far more research in determining the impacts of competition on the cost and interest rates of bonds. More studies using national databases and additional service sectors are needed. We also need to better understand the nature of competition between issuers.
Are local authorities sometimes the equivalent of local monopolies? What is the nature of competition between state and local level authorities in those states in which both are operating, and do beneficiaries perceive a choice between local and state level authorities? Nevertheless, it appears wise to continue the calls to promote and foster competition in the municipal bond market, both through competitive rather than negotiated sales and through deconcentrating the state finance agency regimes.
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BOX: Data and Methodology
The data used in this paper are derived from a data base we have constructed of all new issues of municipal securities from 1980-1993. The data were purchased from Securities Data Company (SDC) and each bond issue is an observation. The empirical analysis in this project is based on approximately 6,000 new hospital bond financings and refinancings. Data on issue characteristics are merged with hospital, national, state, and local market area characteristics from a variety of sources. The true interest cost (tic), or yield to maturity or internal rate of return, is the most widely used summary measure of the interest rate on a municipal bond issue from the borrower's point of view. This rate equates the proceeds received by the beneficiary to the present value of interest payments and principal repayments. For a more detailed description of the data base, with a full definition of and computation method for the tic, an appendix is available from the authors.
In order to compute most accurately the tic, we needed to know the fees that were charged by the finance authorities. This information was not available, so we devised and implemented a national survey of all health care finance authorities to determine the level of fees charged. To obtain information on fees charged by issuers and changes in fees over time, we conducted a survey of all issuers classified as state authorities, local authorities, and districts.
The survey universe consisted of 999 issuers. Those receiving questionnaires issued 4,824 bonds with a total real par value of $130 billion in 1982-84 dollars during the period 1980 through 1993. Of the 999 issuers in the survey, 359 returned the questionnaire. Thus, the response rate of 36 percent in terms of issuers was relatively modest. The respondents, however, accounted for 65 percent of all issues done by the survey universe and for 71 percent of their real par value.
These response rates are much more impressive. They indicate that our survey includes most of the large issuers both in terms of the number of bond deals and their total par value.
Regressions were estimated with a sample drawn from the 5,799 issues where tics exclusive of fees can be computed. 1,213 issues were done by state and local authorities who received the survey and did not respond and 10 were done by issuers who responded but did not report information on fees. Thus, the sample (n =4,576) excludes these issues. Measures of the number of issuers and the concentration of par value among issuers are based on all 6,701 hospital issues in the full data base. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable, the true interest cost inclusive of fee in the sample, are 8.223 and 2.340, respectively. Table B1 presents the definitions, means, and standard deviations of the independent variables. Table 1 presents the standard OLS regression results. There are, however, a few variable definitions and omissions that may need additional discussion. First, while the database includes refinancings, a dummy for a refinancing was not significant and is therefore excluded from these results. Second, we do not know the number of bids for competitive bids and therefore include only a dummy for negotiated. While most studies include the number of bids, they are also generally limited to much smaller numbers of observations than we have. Third, we do not include bond ratings because given our detailed specification we consider them to be endogenous. Regressions with the ratings included were not substantively different, however. Finally, we have not included a variable for issue size because we consider it to be an endogenous variable and we are presenting a reduced form equation.
Independent variables include
We have used two widely-used measures of concentration: the four firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index. For example, see Tirole (1988) or Scherer and Ross (1990) . The former is defined as the fraction of industry output accounted for by the four largest producers.
The latter is defined as the sum of the squared share of each producer in total output. The Herfindahl index ranges from 1 in the case of pure monopoly to 1/n j in the case of n j firms, each of whom produces the same output. The fewer are the number of firms and the more concentrated output is among them, the larger is the value of the index. For both measures real par value is used as output in this context. The issuer's history of real par values (total real par value of all previous issues) measures its experience. One hypothesis is that more experienced agencies have more knowledge concerning the tax-exempt bond market, which may result in lower tics on their bonds exclusive of fees. Another hypothesis is that fees and tics inclusive of fees fall with experience if the costs of more experienced agencies are lower than those with less experience.
These two hypotheses suggest it may be important to control for experience in estimating the effects of concentration or the number of issuers on tics exclusive of fees. This is because the more concentrated is the market the more likely it is that the total real par values of previous issues is greater. But the experience effects described do not operate through concentration. Put differently, issuers in more concentrated markets have lower costs of production than those in less concentrated markets.
Another hypothesis is that experienced agencies have fewer incentives to invest resources that lower the tic because they have a well-established clientele. Moreover, fees may rise if more experienced issuers have more monopoly power (have lower price elasticities of demand). In these cases there is less reason to control for experience in estimating the effect of concentration because experience and concentration are proxies for the same causal mechanism. The experience measure is specific to each issuer and is exclusive of the most recent financing (which serves as the observation in the regression analysis). It can be characterized as a lagged variable and was obtained from a backward search of the SDC data base. Nursing home and life care issues are included because these reflect experience in issuing tax-exempt bonds.
The hospital's history of real par values (total real par value of all previous issues) measures its experience in using the tax-exempt bond market to finance capital investment. As in the case of issuer experience, the effects of this variable on the tic or the fee are ambiguous on a priori grounds. Reductions in these variables due to the increased knowledge possessed by hospitals who have made more use of the bond market in the past may be offset by several factors. Less experienced hospitals may have more incentives to search for an issuer that will help secure a lower tic exclusive of fee or charge a lower fee. Moreover, these hospitals may be more sensitive to fees (may have demand functions with larger price elasticities of demand). If issuers can engage in price discrimination, the fee charged to a less experienced hospital may be lower. The experience measure is exclusive of the most recent financing and was obtained from a backward search of the SDC database. 3. See for instance Grossman, Goldman, Nesbitt, and Mobilia (1993) . For additional studies on the determinants of the cost of capital in the health care sector, see Austen, Corman, and LiCalzi (1986) ; Carpenter (1991) ; and Cleverley and Rosegay (1982) .
4. The sum of the underwriter's costs and profit is termed the gross spread. In a competitive deal the underwriter covers costs and makes a profit by purchasing the bonds from the issuer at approximately par value and re-offering them above par. In a negotiated deal the underwriter does not directly purchase the bonds. Instead, it finds customers who purchase the bonds from the issuer at par. The underwriter then subtracts its costs and profit from the proceeds received by the issuer. In either case the beneficiary of the bond issue borrows at a higher interest rate than the rate received by the ultimate purchasers of the bonds. A negotiated deal may involve an original issue discount which further reduces the proceeds received by the issuer. This occurs when some bonds in the issue (usually the term bonds and the serials with relatively long maturities) are offered to the public at less than par value.
5.
In contrast, Sorensen (1979) reports that a negotiated deal adds 12 basis points to the interest rate in the case of new financings of corporate bonds. Simonsen and Robbins (1996) report that negotiated deals add about 29 basis points for general obligation bonds in Oregon.
6. Technically, we should probably use the term "deconcentrated" rather than "decentralized," since it is entirely possible for a state to have many state-level issuers, which would thus be picked up by the measures of concentration. However, in practice, deconcentrated states are also decentralized because they have local issuers. Therefore, the term "decentralization" is also appropriate.
